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The MiFID Implementing Measures:  
Excessive detail or level playing field? 
Jean-Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo* 
 
The present Policy Brief involves a detailed critical analysis of the MiFID Directive’s draft implementing measures. It sets 
out to examine the evolution of EU regulation of investment firms from the original Investment Services Directive through 
the MiFID implementing measures, arguing that the EU Commission has moved from a principles- to a rules-based 
approach. The great level of detail in some of the implementing measures will impose significant costs to investment firms 
and could trigger unintended consequences. Nevertheless, some of the negative effects of the MiFID will surely be offset by 
the benefits derived from replacing 25 different regulatory regimes with a harmonised set of rules. 
 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (or MiFID, 
Directive 2004/39/EC) – the EU legislative text regulating 
the activities of brokers and exchanges, and which replaces 
the 1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD) – is 
probably the most important measure in the Financial 
Services Action Plan. It also represents a prime chance to 
assess the application and functioning of the Lamfalussy 
approach. As with other Lamfalussy directives, the MiFID 
is composed of a Level 1 text that serves as a 
superstructure setting out the core principles of legislation, 
while the more detailed provisions are set out subsequently 
in Level 2 texts, the so-called ‘implementing measures’, 
which are less handicapped by slow political deliberations 
than Level 1. The MiFID’s Level 1 framework directive 
was adopted by the Council and the Parliament in April 
2004. More recently, the MiFID has undergone an 
additional level of detail, with the publication of the draft 
Level 2 implementing measures in February 2006.
1 
The MiFID implementing measures strongly confirm the 
general trend towards more detailed securities legislation 
in the EU, a tendency that was already clear from the 
Level 1 framework directive. The latter contains no fewer 
than 20 articles on which detailed implementing provisions 
can be adopted. These are subdivided into measures 
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governed by a regulation (harmonised approach) and by a 
directive (more flexible approach). While the former are 
directly applicable in EU member states, thereby entering 
into effect immediately, the latter still need to be 
transposed by the member states into national law.  
The implementing directive covers issues that are 
essentially applicable to investment firms, especially 
conduct-of-business rules such as: exercising due diligence 
in selling services to retail clients, client order handling, 
best execution, safeguarding client assets, conflicts of 
interest and outsourcing. The implementing regulation 
covers the hotly contested area of pre- and post-trade 
transparency, as well as record keeping and transaction 
reporting. It applies to exchanges as well as to investment 
firms. Table 1 provides a detailed breakdown of how 
regulated functions are treated in the implementing 
measures as regards the legislative instrument under which 
they fall. 
The Commission justifies the two-fold approach it adopted 
(i.e. dividing the implementing measures into a regulation 
or a directive according to the nature of the regulated 
function) in order to ensure that the same conditions apply 
evenly across the EU, albeit with differing degrees of 
standardisation. In the background note that accompanies 
both implementing measures, the Commission services 
explain that “for the majority of envisaged measures, 
uniform solutions are desirable to avoid ‘gold-plating’ by 
member states”.
2 The regulation covers those areas where 
the texts are sufficiently exhaustive to allow direct 
application in the member states. Where this was 
technically or legally not possible, the Commission 
proposes a “principles-based though tightly-worded 
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directive”.
3 In other words, even if there is no explicit 
reference in the legislative text as such that officially 
qualifies MiFID as a ‘maximum harmonisation’ directive, 
due to the tight phrasing, the MiFID implementing 
directive amounts to a ‘maximum harmonisation’ approach 
in spirit.
 4 At the same time, the Commission explains that 
it decided to have a directive for part of the implementing 
measures in order to “avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
by introducing obligations that allow for the calibration of 
the requirements according to the nature, scale and 
complexity of the particular investment firm”.
5  
Table 1. MiFID level 2 measures 
Measure Directive  Regulation 
Admission of financial 
instruments to trading 
   
Best execution     
Client assets     
Client order handling     
Conflicts of interest     
Derivative financial instruments     
Eligible counterparties     
Inducements     
Information to clients     
Investment advice – definition     
Organisational requirements     
Outsourcing     
Post-trade transparency 
(regulated firms, MTFs and 
investment firms) 
   
Pre-trade transparency 
(regulated markets and MTFs) 
   
Pre-trade transparency 
(systematic internalisers) 
   
Record-keeping     
Record-keeping: client orders 
and transactions 
   
Reporting to clients     
Suitability and appropriateness      
Transaction reporting     
Source: Norton Rose. 
Despite the Commission’s insistence on paring down the 
opportunities for member states to ‘gold-plate’ EU 
legislation so as to ensure an EU-wide level playing field, 
one article of the implementing directive still offers a 
                                                        
3 Background note to the draft Commission directive, p. 4. 
4 A maximum harmonisation directive can be thought of as 
one in which certain articles are phrased so tightly that they 
effectively allow no flexibility whatsoever for national 
legislators to adopt divergent approaches. In other words, the 
‘maximum harmonisation’ approach amounts to little else 
than a regulation imbedded in a directive. 
5 Background note to the draft Commission directive, p. 5. 
loophole, and thus has immediately raised concerns on the 
part of market participants. Art. 4 stipulates that member 
states “may retain or impose requirements additional to 
those in the directive only in exceptional cases where such 
requirements are objectively justified and proportionate 
…” [emphasis added]. The same article goes on to detail 
these requirements and to impose a duty on member states 
to notify the Commission of the reference of this article in 
national implementing law. Until there is convincing 
evidence to the contrary, concerns about Art. 4 seem 
justified, as it opens a backdoor to a roughening of the 
level playing field.  
A comparison with the ISD 
What immediately comes to mind when sketching a broad 
comparison between the ISD and the MiFID is that the 
MiFID comes across as far more onerous and detailed than 
its predecessor. It is the price to pay for wanting to create a 
level playing field through the implementation of statutory 
rules rather than through the establishment of common 
principles. In general terms, the ISD can be thought of as 
‘light-touch’ legislation that is inspired by a principles-
based approach, while the MiFID takes a heavier-handed 
approach which sets out detailed rules, even in those 
articles that are supposedly inspired by principles.  
While the original ISD had 32 articles and no 
implementing measures, the new MiFID has 169 articles, 
of which 73 comprise the Level 1 framework directive and 
96 are accounted for by the implementing measures (see 
Table 2). Not all 20 of the Level 1 directive’s articles that 
introduce the possibility to enact implementing legislation 
have been addressed in the draft implementing measures 
released by the Commission. One therefore needs to be 
mindful that even more implementing measures can be 
expected to come. At the present time, however, the 
implementing measures further double the length of the 
total MiFID legislation, after the original MiFID 
framework directive was already twice as long as the 
Investment Services Directive. In other words, combined, 
the Level 1 and Level 2 MiFID legislation is five times as 
‘burdensome’ as the original ISD, if the length of a 
legislative text is a reasonable proxy for the expanse and 
depth of a regulatory regime.  
It might be misleading to compare the total word count of 
the ISD with that of the MiFID, since the MiFID is broader 
in scope than the ISD. For example, investment advice, 
which was not regulated under the ISD, has now come into 
the EU regulatory fold under the MiFID regime. Likewise, 
cooperation agreements between competent authorities as 
regards the transfer of information on the activities of 
investment firms were not carefully spelled out in the ISD, 
but are meticulously set out in the MiFID Level 1 and 
Level 2 texts. That the MiFID is 5 times as lengthy as the 
ISD therefore need not necessarily imply that it is more 
burdensome, since the regulated functions that come under 
these two sets of legislative texts do not exactly match.  THE MIFID IMPLEMENTING MEASURES: EXCESSIVE DETAIL OR LEVEL PLAYING FIELD?| 3 
Table 2. A comparison of the ISD, the MiFID and its implementing measures 
  Number of 
articles 
Articles open 
to comitology* 
Total word count 
(including recitals) 
ISD I (1993)  32  Few and never implemented  14,381 
ISD II  
(Commission draft, 2002) 
67 18  25,556 
MiFID Level 1 Directive  73  20  31,451 
MiFID Total Level 2  96    35,741 
MiFID Draft Implementing 
Measures Directive 
55  Covering 6 articles of level 1 directive  21,729 
MiFID Draft Implementing 
Measures Regulation 
41  Covering 13 articles of level 1 directive  14,012 
MiFID total  169    67,192 
MiFID  = x times the ISD  5.28    4.67 
* An article of the framework directive which is open to comitology can lead to the adoption of further implementing measures. 
 
Another caveat about the length proxy we have chosen is 
that it cannot measure the quality of a regulatory regime. 
Just because legislation is more detailed does not mean the 
quality of a regulatory regime need necessarily deteriorate. 
On the contrary, compliance departments generally prefer 
more detailed rules, because the more detailed the rules, 
the greater the legal certainty surrounding a firm’s 
business activities, at least within an EU context. At the 
same time, it must also be recognised that the more level 
playing field introduced by MiFID means that large 
investment firms with operations in several member states 
no longer need to comply with a panoply of different 
conduct-of-business rules, thus streamlining corporate 
legal work and administrative red tape. 
While maintaining the word length proxy, a better way 
perhaps to measure the relative legislative ‘burden’ of the 
MiFID and its predecessor than comparing a word count of 
the entire body of the legislative texts, is to compare the 
length of the specific articles governing similar regulated 
functions. Such an exercise will give a much better idea of 
the burden investment firms will face when engaged in 
given business activities under the two regimes. 
Not surprisingly, the results point to a far greater burden of 
regulation surrounding specific regulated functions in the 
MiFID over the ISD than suggested by the general word 
length comparison at the bottom of Table 2. Whereas the 
bottom line in the latter table reveals that the MiFID is five 
times longer than the ISD, the weight of the regulatory 
prescriptions governing specific conduct-of-business rules 
in MiFID, measured as the ratio of the length of MiFID 
rules to the same rules under the ISD, are multiples of 
those in the ISD, as Tables 3 and 4 show. This result is 
essentially due to the MiFID’s elaborating detailed rules 
on conduct of business, whereas the ISD only set some 
general principles for conduct of business, which it left up 
to the member states to design (so long as they were non-
discriminatory). 
In the remainder of this policy brief, we focus on four core 
issues, which largely explain how the MiFID has departed 
from the ISD’s principles-based approach: management of 
conflicts of interest, suitability and appropriateness of 
financial products for given categories of clients, best 
execution policy and price transparency. These provisions 
explain to a large extent the increase in size of MiFID in 
comparison to the ISD. 4 | Jean-Pierre Casey & Karel Lannoo 
Table 3. Evolution from principles to rules 
  ISD MiFID 
Function Rec.*/Art(s).  Word 
count 
Total Rec./Art(s).  Word 
count 
Total 
Post-trade 
transparency 
Rec. 42 
Art. 21 
60 
567 
627  Rec. 44-46 
(Level 1) 
Arts. 28, 30, 45 
(Level 1) 
Rec. 13-15 
(Level 2, R) 
Arts. 26-29,31 
(Level 2, R) 
356 
1342 
212 
790 
2700 
Suitability and 
appropriateness 
Rec. 32 
Arts. 11.1, 11.3 
38 
95 
133 
 
Arts. 19.4-19.6  
(Level 1) 
Arts. 36-39 
(Level 2, D) 
498 
823 
1321 
Conflicts of interest  Rec. 37 
Arts. 10, 11.1** 
135 
87 
222  Rec. 29 
(Level 1) 
Arts. 13.3, 18, 39 
(Level 1) 
Rec. 3, 20-23 
(Level 2, D) 
Arts. 21-25 
(Level 2, D) 
50 
335 
407 
1789 
2581 
Record-keeping 
 
Art. 20  100  100  Art. 13.6, 25.2 
(Level 1) 
Rec. 54 
(Level 2, D) 
Art. 51 
(Level 2, D) 
156 
78 
318 
552 
Best execution  Art. 11***  0 
159 
0 
(159) 
Rec. 33 
(Level 1) 
Art. 21 
(Level 1) 
Arts. 44-46 
(Level 2, D) 
43 
607 
698 
1348 
* A recital (rec.) is a formal statement appearing in a legal document that is preliminary in nature and provides an explanation of the reasons for 
the legislation or regulation. 
** In each of these articles, which cover more than just conflicts of interest, the subparagraphs on conflicts of interest were the only ones that 
were selected for the word count, not the entire article. 
*** Art. 11 of the ISD does not expressly address best execution as such. In fact, the ISD does not impose MiFID-style best execution 
requirements. Nevertheless, the ISD does require investment firms to “act in the best interests of their clients”, “apply due diligence” and “comply 
with regulatory requirements to promote the best interests of their clients”, which we have taken to include a self-imposed best execution practice. 
 
Table 4. Ratio of MiFID length to ISD length by regulated function 
Post-trade transparency  Suitability & appropriateness  Conflicts of interest  Record-keeping  Best execution  Average 
4.3 9.9  11.6  5.5  8.5  8.0 
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Suitability 
The shift from a principles-based approach embodied in 
the ISD to one based on rules as found in the MiFID is 
nowhere more evident than in the case of the obligation of 
investment firms to ensure that the products being 
marketed to retail investors correspond to their levels of 
financial education and wealth: the MiFID rules on 
suitability amount to 10 times the length of the ISD rules. 
All the ISD had to say on the matter is contained in a sub-
point of Art. 11.1: “These principles shall ensure than an 
investment firm…seeks from its clients information 
regarding their financial situation, investment experience 
and objectives as regards the services provided” – a total 
of 25 words. This is somewhat elaborated in Art. 11.3, 
which states that the professional nature of the client must 
be taken into account when executing orders.  
By contrast, instead of the simple, principles-based 
approach of Art. 11 of the ISD, the MiFID adopts detailed 
provisions on the exercise of due diligence by investment 
firms in the recommendation and sale of products and 
services to non-professional clients.  These requirements 
involve a so-called ‘suitability test’ and ‘appropriateness 
test’, spelled out in Arts. 19.4 and 19.5 of the MiFID 
framework directive, respectively. Each of these tests 
serves a different purpose, responding to the different 
scope, functions and characteristics of the investment 
services to which they relate, as highlighted in Recitals 49 
and 51 of the MiFID draft implementing directive. The 
‘suitability test’ applies only when an investment firm 
provides investment advice or portfolio management for a 
client, while the ‘appropriateness test’ applies to other 
investment services. Under Arts. 36.3 and 36.4 of the draft 
implementing directive, investment firms must extract the 
following information from non-professional clients prior 
to providing a service and/or offering a type of 
product/transaction (except for execution-only services): 
source/extent of client income, client assets, including 
liquid assets, investments and real property, and regular 
financial commitments (Art. 36.3); length of time client 
wishes to hold onto investment, risk profile and risk 
preferences, purposes of investing (Art. 36.4); types of 
service, transaction, financial instrument with which the 
client is familiar, nature/volume/frequency of previous 
financial transactions carried out by the client, and the 
level of education/relevant professional experience of the 
client (Art. 38).  
We spell out the provisions of the suitability and 
appropriateness tests in such detail so that the reader can 
appreciate to what extent these extensive requirements 
amount to a serious burden in terms of the accompanying 
documentation a client must provide to an investment firm 
before the latter can provide any services beyond trade 
execution only. If retail clients fail to provide such 
documentation on request, an investment firm may feel 
uneasy about providing them with anything but the most 
basic, low-yield products. This potential reticence could 
well prove detrimental to the client, who would effectively 
be locked into a product straight jacket. In addition, retail 
clients may simply self-select out of complex products that 
will require a lot of form-filling and documentation, since 
these would increase the administrative burden of 
investing. Ironically, the enhanced investor protection 
measures that are addressed by the suitability and 
appropriateness tests could produce adverse effects by 
limiting the range of investment opportunities. Rather than 
widening the channel for retail investments to access 
higher-yield, innovative and non-traditional retail products, 
they could induce retail investors to shun certain types of 
investment.  
Best execution 
Provisions on best execution are part of conduct-of-
business rules, and aim to maximise the value of a client’s 
portfolio, in the context of the client’s stated investment 
objectives and constraints. This does not necessarily mean 
the lowest price of a trade. Unlike the NMS ‘trade-
through’ rule in the US,
6 by which best execution is firmly 
measured against a clear quantitative indicator, i.e. price, 
the MiFID takes a more flexible approach to best 
execution (Art. 21), introducing other factors that could 
satisfy best execution requirements, such as transaction 
costs, the speed and likelihood of execution and settlement 
and other considerations (provided the client specifies non-
price criteria as more important than price and identifies 
them to the broker). Though many will agree that a more 
flexible framework is preferable for both brokers and their 
clients, its main disadvantage is that it raises a critical 
challenge as regards its enforceability. When best 
execution is determined on the basis of price, it is easier to 
detect whether or not the requirements have been fulfilled 
than when a whole area of variables can satisfy best-
execution requirements, based on the client’s preferences. 
Even with a price criterion as the sole metric, it remains 
very difficult to prosecute lapses in best execution in 
practice. The concept will always be shrouded in some 
degree of abstraction, rendering its translation into practice 
difficult.  
Provisions on best execution were very vaguely defined in 
the ISD’s Art. 11, which required that investment firms act 
“in the best interest of their clients”. The interpretation of 
this statutory requirement differed significantly from one 
member state to another, and the fact that host country 
authorities could interpret this provision as they saw fit, 
regardless of the regulatory regime prevailing in 
neighbouring countries, significantly hampered the cross-
border provision of financial services under the ISD. It was 
one of the reasons why the EU Commission pushed for an 
overhaul of the directive.  
The MiFID provisions on the subject are comprised in 3 
articles (Arts. 19(1), 20 (best execution) and 21 (client 
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order handling rules), all of which can be further 
elaborated in implementing measures. Art. 20 of MiFID 
defines best execution as not only a matter of the price of a 
trade, but also “costs, speed, likelihood of execution and 
settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant 
to the execution of the order”. Investment firms are 
therefore required to establish and implement order 
execution policies.  
The best execution criteria of the draft implementing 
measures are further detailed in two sets of three articles. 
They further broaden the picture for best execution policy, 
requiring firms to take into account the characteristics of 
the client and the nature of his/her order, and the 
characteristics of the financial instruments and execution 
venues. The criteria for retail clients seem to be essentially 
the price and costs, as is further detailed in a paragraph. 
Firms cannot discriminate between execution venues, and 
are requested to review their execution policy annually. 
It remains to be seen whether the MiFID’s best-execution 
requirements will remove flexibility from the system 
because it will induce firms to select venues based on price 
criteria only. Although more flexible than its US 
counterpart (the Regulation NMS), the MiFID’s wider 
range of best-execution criteria would raise concerns in 
compliance departments about legal certainty surrounding 
best execution obligations. The uncertainty arises from the 
fact that it is far more difficult for systematic internalisers 
to demonstrate to clients and to regulators that they are in 
compliance with best-execution requirements if the latter 
are based on criteria beyond price considerations, such as 
speed and quality of execution, liquidity, etc. As a result, 
investment firms may decide to go for the surest option, 
i.e. to select trading venues solely on price-based criteria, 
thereby removing flexibility as to non-price considerations 
regarding the quality of execution.  
Price transparency 
The primordial difference between the MiFID and the ISD 
is that under the new regime, investment firms and banks 
will be allowed to create a market for shares by trading on 
own account, or acting as ‘systematic internalisers’. 
Generally speaking, the ISD did not allow transactions to 
take place outside the exchange, or regulated market. The 
MiFID abolishes this ‘concentration provision’, but 
requests banks to publish quotes for shares that are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and for which a 
liquid market exists (pre-trade transparency). The draft 
implementing regulation defines the scope for the concept 
of liquid market of shares (free float of €500 million, 
average daily transaction of 500 shares and daily turnover 
of €2 million), which should cover around 500 shares, or 
more than 90% of the daily turnover on the European 
markets, according to the European Commission. Once 
they choose to undertake business activities that would 
classify them as a ‘systematic internaliser’, banks need to 
act almost as exchanges: they need to execute the 
transactions at the quoted prices (or even better), and 
disclose this information to the regulated market or MTF 
as close to real time as possible (maximum delay of 3 
minutes, with an exception clause for unwinding large 
positions, i.e. large tickets – Art. 27, implementing 
regulation) in order to maximise the effectiveness of the 
price formation mechanism. But the regulation says 
nothing about the fees bank can charge for these 
transactions, nor about the use of the information they 
obtain in this way. 
Banks are thus confronted with a huge adaptation if they 
want to act as ‘systematic internalisers’ and offer ‘best 
execution’. Firms will also have to publish much more 
information than before which will mean new 
communications infrastructure. They will need to have the 
systems to record and store both quote information (for a 
period of 12 months for clients and market actors – Art. 
23, implementing regulation)
7 and transaction information 
in order to prove that they are providing best execution. 
And they will have to build new business processes to deal 
with all this.  
All told, the MiFID implementing measures impose very 
detailed and strict rules governing transparency in quotes 
and in client limit orders in the pre-trade phase, and 
governing the content, timing and scope of post-trade 
reports after a trade is executed. The implementing 
regulation leaves very little room for manoeuvre on price 
transparency obligations and aims for a very high degree 
of harmonisation. 
Conflicts of interest 
The regulated function which has suffered the most under 
MiFID (in comparative terms, as regards the regulatory 
burden, proxied by a word count) is the duty of investment 
firms to ensure that they are taking all possible measures to 
mitigate conflicts of interest, and when they are 
unavoidable, to promptly inform their clients of this 
potential. The MiFID text is currently more than 11 times 
the length of the same rules under the ISD. Whether this 
enhanced level of detail will materially improve the quality 
of the regulatory regime in practice still remains very 
much open to question. As is the case with legislative 
measures aimed at eliminating market abuse and insider 
trading, it is very difficult to set rules that will effectively 
prevent conflicts of interest from arising, and that will 
facilitate their detection, management and ultimately, 
prosecution, when a firm is judged to be in breach of its 
obligations.  
Taken on its own, the MiFID level 1 text retains a 
principles-based approach to the detection and 
management of conflicts of interest. For example, Art. 
18.1 requires investment firms to take “all reasonable 
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steps” to identify conflicts of interest and to “maintain and 
operate effective organisational and administrative 
arrangements” (Art. 13.3) with a view to mitigating them. 
So long as these steps are not explicitly spelled out in the 
legislation, the text remains principles-based. However, 
Art. 18.3 mandates the Commission to adopt implementing 
measures to “define the steps that investment firms might 
reasonably be expected to take to identify, prevent, 
manage and/or disclose conflicts of interest”. These steps, 
which include measures such as the severance of direct 
remuneration linkages between functions giving rise to 
conflicts of interest and separate supervision of these 
functions, lie in a grey zone between a principles- and 
rules-based approach, which one could define call 
‘detailed principles’. 
Under the MiFID implementing directive (Art. 22), 
investment firms are expected to implement a 
comprehensive or holistic conflicts of interest policy 
covering all business lines. Disclosure is not a substitute 
for aggressively resolving conflicts of interest. In fact, 
client notification is a last resort meant to act as a final 
safeguard only after an investment firm, having taken “all 
reasonable steps” to suppress conflicts of interest with a 
“reasonable degree of confidence”, finds that the 
organisational and administrative arrangements it has 
undertaken under its general conflicts of interest policy are 
insufficient.  
The draft implementing directive (Recital 22) specifically 
mentions certain business lines that are particularly prone 
to conflicts of interest, namely: investment research and 
advice, proprietary trading, portfolio management and 
corporate finance business such as underwriting and 
advising on M&A. By far the strictest and most detailed 
provisions relate to the ancillary service of investment 
research. The draft implementing directive lays out the 
specific conditions to which financial analysts must 
adhere, and the situations/transactions which they must 
eschew. 
Conclusions 
In 2003, we argued that the MiFID (in its first draft) was 
symptomatic of a tendency to introduce excessive 
harmonisation in the implementation of the Lamfalussy 
approach.
8 Based on the numbers and examples presented 
above, we maintain that this directive is probably too 
onerous for many markets to absorb, and will probably 
lead to excessive centralisation and concentration in EU 
securities markets at this time. The MiFID renders 
operating conditions so much more demanding that many 
firms, especially smaller brokers, might simply prefer to 
stay out of certain business lines. It may also open the way 
to much more litigation than we have seen so far. Thus, 
                                                        
8 “The New ISD: A symptom of excessive harmonisation in 
the implementation of the Lamfalussy approach?”, CEPS 
Commentary, 17/02/03 (available from www.ceps.be). 
considerably more onerous conduct-of-business rules 
explain why the MiFID is longer and more taxing on 
investment firms than was the ISD. Whether the MiFID 
directive as it currently stands with its implementing 
measures involves excessive detail, or whether detailed 
statutory provisions are unavoidable if a pan-European 
level playing field is to emerge, remains a subject of 
intense controversy. 
However, we do not wish to suggest that nothing good can 
come of the MiFID. For one thing, a single set of conduct-
of-business rules replaces 25. Another advantage of the 
strict MiFID order execution rules is that they force 
investment firms to police their trading activities more 
rigorously. As such, self-regulation becomes more robust 
and credible. Indeed, if broker-dealers can exercise 
ownership of the rules and act upon them, then they should 
be freer to operate within the parameters set by regulators. 
In other words, an unexpected blessing of the MiFID could 
be that it makes investment firms more responsible by 
forcing them to ensure themselves – prior to regulatory 
intervention – that they are acting in the best interests of 
their clients and in compliance with the established rules. 
The onus is therefore placed on them. For example, faced 
with stricter best-execution rules in the US, Merrill Lynch 
decided to introduce a Best Execution Analysis and 
Monitoring System, which monitors execution quality for 
order flows sent to other broker-dealers and for 
internalised orders in real time. The audit trail empowers 
traders and compliance officers to control the execution 
quality of every order and to introduce appropriate 
safeguards where necessary. This is not necessarily an 
unwelcome development.  
Whether for better or for worse – and a simple word count 
will not yield the answer – what is clear is that there has 
been a marked departure from a principles-based approach 
followed in the ISD to a rules-based approach integrated in 
the MiFID.  This departure has been accompanied by the 
tendency on the part of Community legislators to introduce 
more detail into EU securities law texts. As a result, the 
scope for mutual recognition to run its course is 
increasingly constrained by a levelling-up of harmonised 
legislative measures. Yet it may be that the more detailed 
legislation may simply reflect a political climate that is not 
favourable to free competition between regulatory regimes, 
which would rely on a more generous application of the 
mutual recognition principle.  
With 18 months to go before the deadline for 
implementation, continued uncertainty as to the final form 
the implementing measures will take, together with delays 
in investment firms’ planning for the challenges the MiFID 
presents IT systems the impact the directive and its 
implementing provisions will have on the markets still 
remains very much a matter of guesswork.. What is 
known, however, is that the task of making the 
implementing measures work in practice will require 
concerted effort on the part of regulators, IT professionals 
and compliance departments for some time to come. 
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